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[1] Better understanding of the factors that shape the use of technical knowledge in water
management is important both to increase its relevance to decision‐making and sustainable
governance and to inform knowledge producers where needs lie. This is particularly
critical in the context of the many stressors threatening water resources around the world.
Recent scholarship focusing on innovative water management institutions emphasizes
knowledge use as critical to water systems’ adaptive capacity to respond to these stressors.
For the past 15 years, water resources management in Brazil has undergone an
encompassing reform that has created a set of participatory councils at the river basin level.
Using data from a survey of 626 members of these councils across 18 river basins, this
article examines the use of technical knowledge (e.g., climate and weather forecasts,
reservoir streamflow models, environmental impact assessments, among others) within
these councils. It finds that use of knowledge positively aligns with access, a more diverse
and broader discussion agenda, and a higher sense of effectiveness. Yet, use of technical
knowledge is also associated with skewed levels of power within the councils.
Citation: Lemos, M. C., A. R. Bell, N. L. Engle, R. M. Formiga‐Johnsson, and D. R. Nelson (2010), Technical knowledge and
water resources management: A comparative study of river basin councils, Brazil, Water Resour. Res., 46, W06523,
doi:10.1029/2009WR007949.
1. Introduction
[2] Scarcity and the degradation of freshwater resources
are two of the greatest problems facing societies today. The
predicted negative effects of climate change on water
resources further exacerbate the need for innovative and
adaptive management institutions to simultaneously address
current levels of stresses and to build systems that are more
resilient for the future. Scholars point to different kinds of
knowledge use, including technical, lay, and indigenous, as a
crucial ingredient for the successful management of natural
resources and adaptive capacity building [Berkes et al.,
2000; Brooks et al., 2005; Dietz et al., 2003; Lemos and
Agrawal, 2006; Smit et al., 2000]. In decentralized water
resources management, for example, technical knowledge
can inform managers and stakeholders about physical and
environmental aspects of river basins as well as contribute to
conflict resolution and reduce transaction costs. By enabling
better‐informed decisions, it can also encourage stake-
holders’ sense of effectiveness, participation, and ownership.
Conversely, lack of knowledge can lead to shortsighted,
unsustainable use of resources. And insulated use of tech-
nical knowledge can reinforce traditional patterns of tech-
nocratic decision making, undermining good governance
goals. Indeed, when technical knowledge is unavailable or
inaccessible and is used in an insulated manner, it can
alienate stakeholders, invite demobilization, and encourage
noncompliance with management decisions [Lemos, 2008].
Moreover, all types of knowledge have been theorized to be a
critical resource for implementing adaptive water resources
management and for building the adaptive capacity and
resilience of vulnerable water systems [Pahl‐Wostl, 2007].
However, there has been relatively little empirical research
assessing the role of technical knowledge in water man-
agement and even less exploring how it relates to broader
institutional mechanisms within the context of emerging
adaptive and integrated water governance approaches. In this
article, we analyze these factors within and across 18 river
basin councils in Brazil.
[3] Water resources management around the world is
characterized by great diversity of knowledge use and
comanagement schemes. For instance, decentralization and
the democratization of water management to the river‐basin
level have received significant attention through renewed
calls for Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)
and similar approaches [Blomquist et al., 2005]. Histori-
cally, Brazilian water agencies and decision makers in
charge have relied heavily on technical knowledge to
manage the country’s public water resources. Engineers,
cloaked in their technical expertise, have traditionally
dominated and insulated decision making in the water sec-
tor, leaving little room for broader societal input [Formiga‐
Johnsson, 2001]. However, for the past 15 years, Brazil’s
water resources management sector has undergone an
extensive reform that includes many of the mechanisms for
good governance prescribed within the IWRM paradigm.
These include the creation of stakeholder‐driven river basin
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councils (committees and consortia), the integration across
policies for sustainable management, and the adoption of the
river basin as the managing jurisdiction. The implementa-
tion of this paradigm to such a wide‐ranging extent is what
makes Brazil unique among its reform counterparts
throughout the world. In the wake of Brazil’s water reform,
we discuss how the use of technical knowledge is changing
in the context of the new management institutions and how
participants in the process perceive and value its use.
[4] Since the early 1990s, over 100 river basin commit-
tees and consortia, formed by representatives from the
government, organized civil society, and water users, have
been created [SRH, 2006]. Their mandate includes design
and implementation of basin management plans, conflict
resolution, and implementation of a bulk water permit and
charge system. Broadening societal participation in water
management is also included [Abers, 2007; Abers et al.,
2009; Brannstrom et al., 2004; Formiga‐Johnsson et al.,
2007].
[5] In principle, the advantages of the use of technical
knowledge in participatory and advisory councils are two-
fold. In material terms, knowledge can improve and facilitate
decision making by supporting better‐informed decisions.
For example, in river basin committees, reservoir models
can inform stakeholders of water availability, recharge and
discharge, potential water shortages, and exposure to cli-
mate‐related events such as the El Niño–Southern Oscilla-
tion (ENSO) or future climate change. In adaptive water
resources management, knowledge networks can influence
and enable learning that supports adaptive response as
problems emerge [Olsson et al., 2004]. In normative terms,
knowledge can empower participation by decision makers
and increase their sense of effectiveness and inclusion,
which, in turn, should encourage further participation
[Lemos, 2008]. It can also democratize the production of
science through the creation of arenas (such as river basin
councils) where expertise can be picked apart and ques-
tioned in the context of multiple interests [Blok, 2007] (for
an alternative view, see also DuPuis and Gareau [2006]). In
other words, if council members have access to technical
knowledge, then they will be able not only to participate
more meaningfully in decision‐making negotiations but also
make better informed decisions. In this context, a better
understanding of the factors that shape knowledge use
contributes to the growing scholarship in water management
and democratization of science. This research can also inform
institutional design and governance of water resources on a
practical level.
[6] This article examines the factors shaping the use of
technical knowledge (specifically, climate and weather
forecasts, reservoir streamflow models, environmental
impact assessments, hydrological models, water quality
information, planning, and management studies, and early
warning studies) in water resources management in Brazil.
In particular, it explores their use by river basin councils
created by the Brazilian reform. While the new management
system might amplify the opportunity for the use of different
kinds of nontechnical knowledge (practical, lay, local
knowledge), this analysis is limited to technical knowledge.
We examine a number of variables that influence knowledge
use in the context of river basin councils’ decision making
(see Table 1). The study uses data collected through a census
survey of 626 members of river basin councils across 18 river
basins in different regions of Brazil. In the next sections,
we discuss these factors, using both quantitative and quali-
tative approaches. First, we explore a few of the theoretical
underpinnings that inform this analysis, including the role of
science‐generated knowledge in decision making and more
specifically in IWRM. Second, we briefly describe Brazil’s
water reform and contextualize the river basin councils and
their role in Brazil’s new water governance. Next, we
explain in further detail the empirical analysis and report our
main results. We conclude with a brief summary of our main
findings and a few suggestions for further research.
2. Technical Knowledge and Decision Making
[7] The importance and criticality of knowledge in water
resources have been repeatedly recognized, both in tradi-
tional and in emerging innovative models of water man-
agement, albeit with different outcomes. In traditional water
resources management, technical knowledge use often seeks
to rationalize or optimize decision making and increase
efficiency. Its deployment, in an insulated manner, can lead
to the concentration of power in the hands of experts at the
expense of other stakeholders’ inputs. Indeed, rather than an
unintended consequence, part of the desirability of technical
knowledge can be explained precisely by its ability to
insulate decision making from “irrational” actors. From a
policymaker’s point of view, there may be many advantages
to gain from a technocratically insulated model of decision
making. First, because policy tools originate in “hard”
research science, therefore requiring technical expertise for
their use, they can insulate policymakers from political
meddling and efforts by powerful interest groups to influ-
ence policy implementation and outcomes [DuPuis and
Gareau, 2006; Lemos and Oliveira, 2004]. Second, tech-
nocratic decision making is also understood as increasing
legitimacy and feasibility and reducing dissent [Ezrahi,
1990; Jasanoff, 1990]. Third, technocrats believe technical
insulation will decrease policies’ vulnerability to criticism
from nontechnical people and politicians [Steel et al., 1993].
Finally, scientific decision making may hold the promise of
value‐free decisions about public policy and therefore
bypass the messiness of dialog and negotiation [Jamieson,
2000]. Here, many of the essential qualities people associ-
ate with science, thoroughness, objectivity, the search for
truth, and rationality, to name just a few, are also the most
desirable characteristics of efficient and effective policy-
making sought after by policymakers [Ezrahi, 1990;
Jasanoff, 1990; Lemos, 2003]. Although this model may
be attractive to decision makers hoping to keep political
meddling or undue influence of particular interest groups at
bay, in reality, decision making is often messy and fraught
with uncertainty [Kingdon, 1985; Lindblom, 1959; Stone,
1988].
[8] Technocratic decision making, however, may defy
basic precepts of democracy by limiting the number of
participants and policy alternatives and by rendering tech-
nocrats unaccountable to elected officials and clients
[Etzioni‐Havely, 1983; Nunes and Geddes, 1987]. Indeed,
when trying to gain political advantage, groups may be
tempted to exaggerate or distort information when that
information serves to support the interests of one group over
another. In this process, information is neutral neither in
terms of power relationships nor in institutional structures
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[Lemos, 2008]. As technical analysis becomes more promi-
nent than other informational input (including opinions and
interests of nontechnical sources), it may “squeeze out other
forms of information, decision‐making routines, and claims”
[Healy and Ascher, 1995, p. 13].
[9] In emerging paradigms such as IWRM and adaptive
management of water systems, knowledge also figures
prominently if in a less insulating format. IWRM and
adaptive management many times involve devolution of
decision making to the watershed scale and the inclusion of
stakeholders in the decision‐making process [Kemper et al.,
2007; Leach et al., 2002; Medema et al., 2008]. In the case
of adaptive management models, decision makers and
institutions not only respond to changes as they emerge but
also learn while doing it [Arvai et al., 2003]. Adaptive
management mechanisms are flexible, responsive, and
inclusive and use knowledge, networks, and social learning
as the basis for decision making at the natural resource level.
It accepts the system as dynamic and unpredictable and
promotes flexible coordination among diverse stakeholders,
various levels of actor–organizational networks, self‐
organization from the ground up, and experimentation and
learning [Folke et al., 2005]. Proponents of these approaches
argue that recognizing the different interests, the interwoven
nature of the problems, and the dynamics and flows of
information, learning, and adaptation represents a model
much more aligned with the inherent complexity (both
social and natural) of the water system. Indeed, in this
context, knowledge is an intrinsic part of management that
interactively shapes and informs decision making and, in
principle, leads to better decisions. As mentioned above,
knowledge use influences and is influenced by levels of
participation. It may also shape deliberation and consensus
formation [Elliott, 1999] and perceptions of power distri-
bution [Lemos, 2008]. The mere creation of decentralized,
stakeholder‐driven councils enhances the opportunity for
knowledge use and distribution in a markedly different way
from traditionally centralized and insulated models of
natural resource management [Brannstrom et al., 2004;
Ribot, 2002].
[10] However, both the IWRM and adaptive management
literatures tend to look at knowledge as an independent
variable affecting the performance of water governance
approaches rather than an outcome whose nature and char-
acteristics need explanation themselves. In effect, these
studies mostly assume that knowledge is available and plays
a positive role (or not) in influencing the quality of water
governance. Often, knowledge, including local and indige-
nous knowledge, is treated as one of the factors shaping the
success or failure of decentralized natural resources man-
agement [Leach et al., 2002; Lubell et al., 2002; Pahl‐Wostl
and Hare, 2004; Ribot, 2002]. Moreover, many of its
findings are based on single case studies in which knowl-
edge use is examined within the context of unique, place‐
based processes [Lemos, 2008; Olsson and Berg, 2005;
Pahl‐Wostl and Hare, 2004]. In this study, we look at
knowledge use as the dependent variable and examine it
against various aspects of the characteristics, organization,
and modus operandi of river basin councils. Because we use
data collected within the river basin committees themselves,
we do not take into consideration broader institutions
affecting knowledge use beyond the council’s activities.
Hence, rather than an exploration of knowledge use in water
management in Brazil as a whole, this study is an exami-
nation of knowledge use within water councils.
3. Water Reform in Brazil
[11] As mentioned above, several characteristics of the
water reform process in Brazil provide an excellent oppor-
tunity to study comparatively the institutional factors that
influence both the use of technical knowledge by river basin
councils and council members’ perception of how it shapes
decision making and relations within these councils. First,
the reform is mainly regulated by a national law enacted in
1997 (Law 9,422 also know as “Water Law”). This law
instituted the National Policy for Water Resources and
created the National System for the Management of Water
Resources and the National Water Agency (Agência
Nacional de Água, ANA), which oversees the application of
the law and has jurisdiction over the management of inter-
state rivers’ watersheds. Although implementation has var-
ied substantially between states as well as between river
basins within the same state, the basic organizing frame-
work, especially in terms of the creation of river basin
councils, has followed the same model of triparty rep-
resentation between public officials, water users, and
representatives of organized civil society (mostly nongov-
ernment organizations and professional associations)
[Brannstrom et al., 2004]. Stakeholders are organized
through both river basin committees and consortia. River
basin committees are legally constituted organizations for
IWRM; their responsibilities are the design and approval of
river basin plans, the establishment of water quality goals,
the creation and implementation of water permitting and
charging mechanisms (including the establishment of pri-
orities of how to spend revenues), and arbitration over
conflicts [Abers, 2007; Abers et al., 2009]. Consortia, in
turn, are not legally established but have very similar
responsibilities as those of the committees although not the
same range and enforcement capabilities. Committees and
consortia (collectively referred to as councils in this article)
generally have a presidency, a deliberative body (the
plenary), and a secretariat. A few councils also have tech-
nical chambers, working groups, or both that create, orga-
nize, and‐or synthesize technical knowledge to support the
plenary decision making. Even fewer councils have a more
robust developed structure that includes an executive agency
to implement decisions at the river basin level [Formiga‐
Johnsson et al., 2007; Lemos and Oliveira, 2004]. Figure 1
shows a map of all river basins included in the study.
[12] Second, the new legislation completely overhauled
the old system, introducing mechanisms for the management
of water resources more in tune with the democratization of
state–society relations after the demise of the Brazilian
military dictatorship in the mid‐1980s. These included (with
variations in regulations across different states) (1) the
organization of management at the watershed level, replacing
a previous system that favored municipal, state, and federal
jurisdictions; (2) the creation of specific regulation to protect
water resources at the watershed level; (3) the decentral-
ization of decision making and resources; (4) the design of a
new system of water concession rights; (5) the creation of
different instances of public participation, especially the
organization of watershed committees and State and National
Water Councils; (6) the insertion of water resources
LEMOS ET AL.: TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT W06523W06523
3 of 12
management within a larger realm of environmental con-
cerns that challenged the traditional supremacy of economic
criteria in water management; and, most controversially,
(7) the implementation of a user’s fee system at the river
basin level. These reforms, in principle, not only democra-
tized decision making by creating stakeholder‐driven
watershed councils but also introduced new patterns of
knowledge use with the creation of water resources man-
agement agencies and technical support groups that work
with the committees [Abers, 2007; Brannstrom et al., 2004;
Formiga‐Johnsson et al., 2007; Lemos and Oliveira, 2004].
[13] Third, in spite of this national framework, the struc-
ture of councils varies from state to state and even within
states. They differ in size and in the allocation of seats
among users, public servants, and civil society groups. In
some states the minutia of council rules and procedures are
regulated by law, while in others the law provides a
framework within which a council may design by‐laws and
create technical support groups as it sees fit. Some of the
design differences are in response to Brazil’s enormous
regional diversity in socioeconomic conditions, political
cultures, natural environments, range of water uses, and
institutional resources. Furthermore, a strong federal system
allows state governments to modify the national model, for
example, by giving priority to intermunicipal consortia over
river basin committees [Brannstrom et al., 2004]. These
sources of variation represent a valuable opportunity to
study the factors that influence knowledge use.
4. Exploring Factors That Affect Knowledge Use
[14] Our analysis uses data from a survey carried out in
Brazil in 2005 by the Watermark project, a broad research
collaboration created in 2001 by U.S. and Brazilian
researchers and water management practitioners. The survey
queried 626 members of 18 river basin councils (14 river
basin committees and 4 consortia) in various parts of Brazil.
To select the survey sample, the river basin councils were
stratified according to four characteristics: region of the
country (northeast, central, southeast, and south), main
Figure 1. Map of Brazil showing river basins studied.
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water‐related problem (scarcity, quality, and flooding), type
of river basin (rural, urban, coastal, or combination rural‐
urban), size of river basin (in square kilometers). Because
councils were intentionally selected within each stratum,
with preference for ones that had been previously studied by
the Watermark Project since 2001, the findings are not
representative and are limited to refer specifically to the
sample basins. Only one committee included in the survey,
the Sapucaí Mirim Grande Committee in São Paulo had not
been the object of such previous qualitative research. Hence,
our findings refer only to the councils examined.
[15] In each council under study, all full members
(membros titulares) were selected to be interviewed and
substituted for by their alternates when unavailable. Thus,
for each council an effective census of members (86% of
members or their alternates) was interviewed. In two coun-
cils, Itajaí and CEIVAP, the members of the technical
chambers were also interviewed. In addition, to interpret and
complement the findings from the quantitative analysis, this
study takes advantage of the extensive qualitative database
collected across these river basins since 2001 by the Water-
mark Project.
[16] We selected one focal question from the Watermark
survey to serve as the dependent variable explored in our
regression models regarding reported technical knowledge
and information use. From the responses, we derived five
dependent variables:
[17] D1, reported use of weather forecasts;
[18] D2, reported use of climate forecasts;
[19] D3, reported use of environmental information sys-
tems, water quality information, and management planning
studies;
[20] D4, reported use of models, forecasts, and disaster
alert systems; and
[21] D5, reported use of all forms of technoscientific
knowledge.
[22] For the independent variables, we first selected
questions that we theorized could offer plausible explana-
tions or provide some insight into the dependent variables.
These included both questions that related to governance
and institutional mechanisms and those that related to var-
ious demographic variables. We then removed from this list
the questions that were not significantly correlated to our
dependent variables at a = 0.05. Next, we clustered the
remaining questions into 20 categories of questions that we
qualitatively inferred to be gauging similar concepts (i.e.,
variables). The categories had from 1 to 9 questions gauging
each of the 20 variables (see Table 1, Appendix A).
[23] We aggregated the individual responses for our
independent and dependent variables to the river basin
committee and consortium level; that is, the 626 individual
responses were aggregated for each basin to produce n = 18
data points characterizing “river basin water management.”
For questions where we were interested in a particular
response (e.g., those responding yes or those responding b),
the variable was coded as the proportion of committee
members giving the response of interest. For questions
where responses could be converted to a cardinal number
(e.g., a scale from 1 to 10, age, income, etc.), we coded the
variable as the mean value for the basin. For questions
where we were interested in the differences among members
within the committee, we calculated the entropy of the
variable. We used the concept of entropy to measure the
disorder or diversity among responses, that is, the range of
agreement or disagreement between committee members
when expressing their opinion (measured in a scale of 1 to
10) regarding different aspects of the committee function-





 lnð1=10Þ ; ð1Þ
where pi is the proportion of committee members respond-
ing i to the particular question. Entropy scales from 0, when
all committee members give the same response to a ques-
tion, to 1, when the responses to a question are evenly
spread across the given scale. We use the level of entropy as
a proxy to measure agreement and disagreement among the
members of any given committee. This entropy calculation
was applied to the questions regarding committee perfor-
mance, how democratically the committee made decisions,
for example, where one might reasonably expect responses
within a committee to be similar. In this context, the entropy
calculation provides a measure of “cohesiveness” within the
committee, describing how much or how little committee
members agree with each other and perceive the committee
similarly.
[24] These three categories of variables (proportions,
mean responses, and entropies) make up the set of variable
types used in this analysis. Each variable was measured
across 18 points for the 18 committees and consortia
included in this study (for a detailed explanation of the
model and aggregation of variables, see Table 2 and
Appendix A). It is important to emphasize that the results
spring from a data set of 18 points, a small but significant
sample of the basin council population (139 for rivers
under state jurisdiction in 2005). While there is disagree-
ment over whether the data set should be larger [Maxwell,
2000] or smaller [Wampold and Freund, 1987], a com-
mon rule‐of‐thumb is that the ratio data points:predictors
should not be less than 10:1 [Maxwell, 2000]. By selecting
for models with at most two terms, we remain at or above
this ratio. We gain further confidence in the regression
results by noting that our P values for the F tests of the
regression models against null models are extremely low
(Table 2). The small number of model terms and the low P
values also give us confidence that the stepwise regression is
not unduly weighting random variation, another point of
caution when using this technique [Menard, 2002]. How-
ever, as mentioned above, because of the small sample,
findings should not be broadly generalized beyond the
studied basins.
5. Regression Model Search
[25] We reduced the data one final time by creating
regression models that pulled a single variable from each of
the 20 independent variable categories (for a total of 20
independent variables) to create a “gene” and performed
stepwise regressions of this set of independent variables
against each dependent variable. The resulting models
retained from 1 to 17 of the independent variable terms. We
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used a “genetic” algorithm to create many such models and
selected among them to maximize the fitness function (see







where j is the number of dependent variables across those
that we evaluated, Rj
2 is a standard measure of how much
variance in the dependent variable is explained by the
regression model, and nj is the number of terms in the
model. This function thus selects for models with high
variance explanation per model term, rather than high
overall variance explanation. To further simplify our model,
we built a simple genetic algorithm to find the “fittest”
regression model for our study, leading to five simple
expressions for our dependent variables:
D1 ¼ 0:23þ 0:47ð0:24ÞTIþ 0:65ð0:32ÞU ; ð3Þ
D2 ¼ 3:79 4:17ð1:25ÞETþ 0:66ð:29ÞS; ð4Þ
D3 ¼ 1:94þ 5:38ð2:83ÞPI; ð5Þ
D4 ¼ 1:92þ 2:48ð1:58ÞTI; ð6Þ
D5 ¼ 1:84þ 7:61ð3:02ÞP þ 4:66ð2:32ÞPW; ð7Þ
Table 1. Variables and Survey Questionnaire Questionsa
Variable Question
AI (actor influence) Which sectors or organs of the committee are the most influential in deciding
the agenda of the committee’s plenary meetings? [Those answering “the officers.”]
CR (conflict resolution) What grade would you give to the committee on attempting to negotiate conflicts
among members in a democratic fashion?
D (level of democratization) What grade would you give to the committee regarding communication with the
population at large?
E (education) How far did you go in school? [Graduate degree]
ET (entropy) Sum of various questions, gauging members’ opinions (in a 1–10 scale) regarding
different issues such as level of democracy, conflict, effectiveness, equity, etc.b
F (flexibility) In relation to issues discussed in the committee, did you ever change your mind
about something because of discussions that took place in the committee?
I (income) Indicate for us please your total monthly household income, adding up all your
income, wages, rents, etc., over the last month. [Those answering
“over 40 Minimum Wages (over R$ 10.400,00).”]
LP (level of participation) Assess your involvement in this committee…how often do you participate
in a majority of plenary meetings, a few meetings, or none?
[Those answering “present proposals.”]c
P (performance) What grade would you give to the committee as to its success in influencing
the decisions of governmental organs?
PI (perception of information value) How much relevance you would attribute information about water quality for
solving the basin’s problems?
TR (Trust) Which (people‐groups‐organizations) on this list do you have the most confidence
for producing and distributing technical information in your committee?
[Those answering “organs of government.”]
PW (power) In some committees, there are distinctions among members that can make a
democratic decision‐making process difficult. In your view, which of these
distinctions have gotten in the way of democracy in your committee?
[Those answering “unequal political power among members.”]
S (stake) Is your agency, firm, or municipality located in the basin?
TE (technical experiences) Do you have experience in law, political institutional issues, economics?
TI (technocratic insulation) In your opinion, are most decisions negotiated before the plenary meeting
takes place ?
TN (technical networks) Have you been to any meetings of Brazilian Association of Sanitary
Engineers (ABES)?
U (understanding) Speaking now of the dissemination of technical information among the
members‐associates of the committee, would you say that the presentations
are made in a way that facilitates understanding on the part of all members?
AA (access) Speaking now of the dissemination of technical information among the
members‐associates of the committee, would you say that they are available
and accessible to all members‐associates?
AP (access to participation) In some cases, committee members find it difficult to come to meetings.
If this is true for you, which obstacle is the main difficulty you encounter?d
OA (outreach activities) What do you do in relation to the committee’s activities in addition to the plenary
meetings; tell us how often you represent the committee in other forums?
aSome questions are coded as the proportion of respondents that give the answers included in brackets.
bThe concept of entropy is based on the level of agreement between members regarding these issues.
cAnswer is coded according to an assigned mean having three points (0, 0.5, 1).
dChoice of obstacles: (1) distance and travel time, (2) transportation cost, (3) difficulty of travel (e.g., bad or dangerous roads), (4) lack of time,
(5) difficulty in getting employer to grant time off, (6) no difficulty, and (7) other.
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(Models include only terms significant at 95% confidence;
numbers in parentheses represent approximate 95% confi-
dence intervals.)
[26] Because the confidence intervals of the regression
terms are relatively broad, the regression equations are more
valuable as descriptive rather than predictive tools for the
relationships studied across the basins. Within these levels
of confidence, the model identified seven factors that
influence the use of technical knowledge by river basin
councils: perception of information value (PI), performance
(P), understanding (U), technocratic insulation (TI), stake
(S), entropy (ET), and power (PW) (for further details see
Table 3 and Appendix A). We find that, first, the higher the
perception among members that their decisions have rele-
vance in terms of water resources management vis‐à‐vis
other sectors of government and society, the higher the level
of reported technical knowledge use (the PI term in D3).
Second, and related to this first factor, the more committee
members perceive that their actions in the committee
influence decisions of the government, the higher the level
of reported technical knowledge use (the P term in D5).
These findings indicate that a member’s perception of
effectiveness may be influenced by their use of knowledge;
that is, members believe either that knowledge use enhances
Table 2. Aggregated Responses
Basins D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 AI CR D E ETa F I LP
Rio Paraíba do Sul 1.57 1.49 −0.41 1.37 0.73 0.09 0.02 −0.39 0.54 −3.01 1.17 0.87 −0.38
Rio Itajaí 1.06 0.97 0.49 1.04 0.80 0.74 −0.05 0.94 0.04 −1.38 −0.22 0.07 −0.28
Alto Tietê −0.38 −0.41 0.00 0.31 0.06 1.32 −1.25 −1.91 0.31 0.48 0.99 1.43 −0.16
Rio Araçuaí −1.39 −1.43 −2.50 −1.53 −2.24 −0.46 −0.02 −0.42 −2.43 0.01 −1.13 −1.43 1.53
Rio das Velhas −1.23 −0.84 −0.08 −0.99 −0.95 −0.54 0.50 0.81 −0.04 0.35 1.11 −0.37 0.75
Rio Pará 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.48 0.26 −0.56 −0.26 1.09 −0.28 −0.34 −0.65 −0.21 −0.78
Rio Pirapama −0.29 −0.31 0.43 0.30 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.02 0.37 −0.14 1.75 0.05 0.48
Rio Sapucaí Mirim Grande −0.08 −0.65 0.24 0.14 0.02 1.31 −0.21 −0.71 0.24 −0.01 1.06 0.80 −1.59
Litoral Norte 0.28 −0.05 0.05 −0.47 −0.52 1.66 0.72 −0.09 −0.52 −0.37 0.90 −0.09 0.06
Baixo Jaguaribe 1.24 1.10 −1.03 1.23 0.39 −0.34 0.53 0.73 −1.66 −0.15 −0.68 −0.74 −0.06
Rio Paracatu −0.76 0.05 −2.90 −1.46 −2.32 −1.07 −2.44 −1.23 −0.91 1.68 −1.91 −0.05 2.32
Lagoa da Conceição −1.59 −1.35 −0.31 −1.53 −1.45 −0.39 −0.69 −0.17 −0.26 0.38 0.00 0.16 0.20
Rio Gravataí −0.76 −0.42 0.00 −0.34 −0.43 −0.09 0.93 −0.15 0.92 −0.27 −0.19 0.87 0.82
Rio Santa Maria 0.99 1.53 0.54 0.23 0.20 −0.20 0.77 1.53 −1.58 −0.07 0.59 −0.51 0.63
Rio Piracicaba 1.82 2.10 0.18 1.34 0.92 1.90 1.15 1.62 0.92 0.34 0.61 2.71 −0.69
Rio Tibagi −0.17 −0.62 −0.26 −0.39 −0.56 0.48 −1.08 −0.02 0.77 0.93 −1.42 0.39 −0.68
Alto e Médio Itapicuru 0.34 0.33 −1.23 −1.45 −1.72 −1.07 −0.11 0.59 −1.78 0.78 0.00 −1.43 −0.47
Região dos Lagos, Rio São
João e Zona Costeira
0.08 0.39 0.72 −0.14 −0.02 2.09 1.97 1.81 0.13 0.87 −0.10 −0.62 1.88
Maximum 1.82 2.10 0.72 1.37 0.92 2.09 1.97 1.81 0.92 1.68 1.75 2.71 2.32
Minimum −1.59 −1.43 −2.90 −1.53 −2.32 −1.07 −2.44 −1.91 −2.43 −3.01 −1.91 −1.43 −1.59
Basins Pa PIa TR PWa Sa TE TIa TN Ua AA AP OA
Rio Paraíba do Sul 0.26 1.08 0.17 0.51 −0.71 0.55 2.69 1.90 0.17 0.14 −0.05 0.04
Rio Itajaí −0.15 −0.78 −0.29 1.24 0.31 0.11 0.50 −0.34 0.46 0.31 0.49 −0.90
Alto Tietê −1.16 −0.34 1.98 0.81 −0.39 1.14 1.54 0.66 −2.03 −0.89 1.95 −0.73
Rio Araçuaí −1.42 −2.66 −0.03 0.00 −0.05 −2.14 −0.27 −1.48 −0.35 −1.37 −1.02 1.91
Rio das Velhas 0.41 0.88 1.34 −0.56 −0.28 0.67 −0.35 1.28 −0.94 −0.74 −0.09 −0.41
Rio Pará 0.68 0.57 −0.27 0.00 −0.48 −0.11 0.52 −0.19 0.18 −0.14 0.32 −0.54
Rio Pirapama 0.01 −0.07 −0.35 −0.20 0.45 0.43 −0.02 0.23 0.03 −0.34 −0.15 1.21
Rio Sapucaí Mirim Grande −0.02 0.01 0.03 1.03 −0.16 −0.29 0.06 −0.45 −0.03 1.07 −0.55 0.67
Litoral Norte 0.04 0.99 −0.22 −1.12 −0.28 0.52 1.70 −0.15 0.53 0.90 0.91 0.79
Baixo Jaguaribe −0.67 −1.50 −1.02 0.81 0.45 −1.34 0.02 −0.90 0.98 −1.22 0.05 0.50
Rio Paracatu −2.41 −1.10 1.87 −1.12 0.00 −2.07 −0.35 −1.08 −1.83 −0.61 −1.24 1.96
Lagoa da Conceição −1.56 −0.43 0.71 0.28 −1.13 0.81 −0.13 0.15 −1.22 −1.52 1.78 −0.83
Rio Gravataí −0.01 0.57 1.19 −0.26 0.00 −1.23 −0.55 1.44 −0.66 0.71 1.09 0.27
Rio Santa Maria 0.18 0.01 −0.49 −1.30 2.27 −0.89 −0.44 −0.45 0.77 1.35 −0.38 −0.25
Rio Piracicaba 1.20 1.21 0.14 0.42 2.27 0.32 2.22 1.55 −0.08 1.39 2.02 −0.26
Rio Tibagi −1.42 −0.01 0.50 2.02 0.17 0.29 0.10 0.15 −0.41 −0.33 −0.60 −2.04
Alto e Médio Itapicuru 0.20 −0.58 −1.00 −1.91 0.31 −1.23 −0.72 −1.21 1.09 0.63 −0.94 0.17
Região dos Lagos, Rio São
João e Zona Costeira
1.35 0.55 −1.82 −0.42 2.27 −0.79 −0.07 0.86 1.82 1.64 0.25 −0.04
Maximum 1.35 1.21 1.98 2.02 2.27 1.14 2.69 1.90 1.82 1.64 2.02 1.96
Minimum −2.41 −2.66 −1.82 −1.91 −1.13 −2.14 −0.72 −1.48 −2.03 −1.52 −1.24 −2.04
All data are shown in standard Z scores.
aBoldface indicates variable included in regression.
Note. Looking across the aggregated data (Table 3) and drawing on our knowledge of a number of the basins in the study where we carried out extensive
qualitative research (i.e., Paraíba do Sul, Itajaí, Jaguaribe, and Pirapama), we find that the values make intuitive sense. In consequence, we are confident
that our choice of the basin as the unit of analysis is appropriate. For example, in reference to council members’ perception of institutional performance, the
below‐average aggregate value for Jaguaribe and average aggregate value for the other three basins are consistent with what we know to be true across the
four basins. Similarly, we cross‐checked the aggregate values for two other variables, access to information and access to participation, and found that they
also reflected well the experience of these particular councils.
LEMOS ET AL.: TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT W06523W06523
7 of 12
Table 3. Significant Factors in the Regressiona
B SE P Value Lower Limit Upper Limit
(D1) Weather Forecasts
AI (actor influence) 0.043 0.15 0.779 −0.251 0.193
CR (conflict resolution) −0.407 0.373 0.293 −1.138 −0.034
D (level of democratization) 0.333 0.387 0.404 −0.425 0.72
E (education) −0.006 0.185 0.973 −0.368 0.178
ET (entropy) −0.123 1.532 0.937 −3.125 1.409
F (flexibility) −0.179 0.292 0.55 −0.752 0.113
I (income) −0.337 0.435 0.451 −1.19 0.097
LP (level of participation) −0.256 0.256 0.333 −0.757 −0.001
P (performance) −0.067 0.351 0.852 −0.754 0.284
PI (perception of information value) −0.146 0.586 0.807 −1.296 0.44
TR (trust) 0.977 0.824 0.255 −0.638 1.801
PW (power) 0.087 0.2 0.671 −0.305 0.286
S (stake) 0.253 0.154 0.123 −0.049 0.407
TE (technical experience) −0.302 0.344 0.395 −0.976 0.042
TI (technocratic insulation) 0.467 0.12 0.001 0.232 0.586
TN (technical networks) −0.282 0.213 0.208 −0.7 −0.069
U (understanding) 0.654 0.164 0.001 0.333 0.818
AA (access) 0.109 0.145 0.463 −0.174 0.254
AP (access to participation) −0.082 0.206 0.697 −0.487 0.124
OA (outreach activities) −0.171 0.301 0.579 −0.76 0.13
Regression R2 value 0.665
F test P value 0.00027
(D2) Climate Forecasts
AI (actor influence) −0.013 0.133 0.923 −0.274 0.12
CR (conflict resolution) −0.692 0.349 0.067 −1.376 −0.343
D (level of democratization) 0.024 0.399 0.954 −0.758 0.422
E (education) −0.007 0.17 0.966 −0.341 0.163
ET (entropy) −4.173 1.252 0.005 −6.628 −2.921
F (flexibility) −0.219 0.304 0.484 −0.815 0.085
I (income) −0.231 0.425 0.595 −1.065 0.194
LP (level of participation) −0.267 0.258 0.318 −0.772 −0.009
P (performance) −0.085 0.343 0.808 −0.757 0.258
PI (perception of information value) 0.323 0.549 0.566 −0.754 0.872
TR (trust) 0.158 0.287 0.59 −0.405 0.446
PW (power) −0.072 0.202 0.727 −0.469 0.13
S (stake) 0.658 0.147 0 0.371 0.805
TE (technical experience) 0.019 0.313 0.953 −0.595 0.332
TI (technocratic insulation) 0.234 0.139 0.115 −0.039 0.374
TN (technical networks) −0.213 0.206 0.319 −0.615 −0.007
U (understanding) −0.066 0.232 0.782 −0.521 0.167
AA (access) 0.026 0.17 0.881 −0.307 0.196
AP (access to participation) 0.064 0.181 0.73 −0.291 0.245
OA (outreach activities) −0.12 0.31 0.703 −0.727 0.189
Regression R2 value 0.63
F test P value 0.00058
(D3) EIS, Water Quality Information, and Management Planning Studies
AI (actor influence) −0.404 0.412 0.343 −1.212 0.009
CR (conflict resolution) 1.408 0.788 0.094 −0.137 2.196
D (level of democratization) 1.1 0.779 0.178 −0.426 1.879
E (education) 0.574 0.656 0.395 −0.712 1.231
ET (entropy) −2.617 3.61 0.48 −9.693 0.994
F (flexibility) 1.513 0.863 0.1 −0.179 2.377
I (income) 1.435 1.377 0.314 −1.265 2.812
LP (level of participation) −0.932 0.699 0.202 −2.301 −0.233
P (performance) 1.549 0.879 0.098 −0.174 2.428
PI (perception of information value) 5.375 1.445 0.002 2.542 6.82
TR (trust) −1.045 0.615 0.11 −2.25 −0.431
PW (power) 0.8 0.514 0.14 −0.207 1.314
S (stake) 0.437 0.407 0.3 −0.361 0.844
TE (technical experience) 1.682 0.95 0.097 −0.179 2.632
TI (technocratic insulation) −0.201 0.409 0.63 −1.003 0.208
TN (technical networks) 0.68 0.654 0.314 −0.601 1.334
U (understanding) 0.691 0.468 0.16 −0.226 1.159
AA (access) 0.366 0.415 0.392 −0.447 0.78
AP (access to participation) 0.718 0.533 0.198 −0.327 1.251
OA (outreach activities) −1.727 0.847 0.06 −3.387 −0.879
Regression R2 value 0.464
F test P value 0.00187
LEMOS ET AL.: TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE AND WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT W06523W06523
8 of 12
the relevance of their decisions to water management and
society or that their enhanced sense of effectiveness
encourages them to seek technical knowledge to support
their decisions.
[27] Third, and not surprisingly, use of knowledge is
positively correlated with the level of understanding of the
information, that is, whether science‐generated knowledge
is accessible to members (the U term in D1). Our survey
questionnaire differentiates between information availability
(whether knowledge was on hand or obtainable) and infor-
mation accessibility (whether potential users were able to
understand technical knowledge). According to our model,
the more members understand the science, the more they
report using it. Conversely, if they believe technical
knowledge, even if available, is not understandable, they
report low use. This suggests that knowledge, even when
available to all, may introduce an element of inequity since
those who understand it may have an unfair advantage in
relation to those who do not. In this case, for knowledge to
be usable and equitable, it needs to be not just available but
also accessible.
[28] Fourth, there is a correlation between when and
where decisions are made and the perceived use of technical
knowledge. Specifically, the more members believe deci-
sions are made during plenary meetings (in the question-
naire a total of 67% of the respondents reported so), the
more they report technical knowledge use (the TI terms in
D1 and D4). While the plenary is the official arena for
collective decision making, in the context of river basin
councils’ negotiations, it is not uncommon for members to
meet outside of and prior to plenary meetings. Such meet-
ings can be motivated either by the need to understand
technical matters that better inform plenary voting or as a
maneuver from members or sectors to build and solidify
Table 3. (continued)
B SE P Value Lower Limit Upper Limit
(D4) Models, Forecasts, and Disaster Alert Systems
AI (actor influence) −0.454 1.003 0.658 −2.42 0.55
CR (conflict resolution) 2.631 1.702 0.143 −0.705 4.333
D (level of democratization) 3.258 1.627 0.064 0.068 4.885
E (education) 0.923 1.187 0.449 −1.404 2.11
ET (entropy) −14.972 8.97 0.116 −32.554 −6.002
F (flexibility) 1.153 1.959 0.565 −2.687 3.112
I (income) −0.336 2.939 0.911 −6.097 2.604
LP (level of participation) −2.269 1.661 0.192 −5.524 −0.609
P (performance) 2.86 1.543 0.084 −0.165 4.403
PI (perception of information value) 1.36 3.894 0.732 −6.273 5.255
TR (trust) −2.427 1.419 0.108 −5.207 −1.008
PW (power) 1.986 1.232 0.128 −0.428 3.218
S (stake) 1.581 0.872 0.09 −0.127 2.453
TE (technical experience) −0.198 2.325 0.933 −4.755 2.127
TI (technocratic insulation) 2.482 0.807 0.007 0.899 3.289
TN (technical networks) −0.024 1.426 0.987 −2.818 1.402
U (understanding) 1.997 1.022 0.07 −0.006 3.019
AA (access) 0.854 0.776 0.288 −0.666 1.629
AP (access to participation) 0.193 1.362 0.889 −2.475 1.555
OA (outreach activities) −1.707 2.003 0.408 −5.634 0.296
Regression R2 value 0.371
F test P value 0.00727
(D5) All Knowledge Types
AI (actor influence) −1.118 0.805 0.187 −2.695 −0.313
CR (conflict resolution) −1.217 3.044 0.695 −7.182 1.827
D (level of democratization) −0.767 2.478 0.762 −5.623 1.711
E (education) 0.451 1.304 0.735 −2.104 1.755
ET (entropy) −12.474 8 0.141 −28.153 −4.474
F (flexibility) 2.599 1.919 0.197 −1.162 4.518
I (income) 0.098 2.85 0.973 −5.488 2.947
LP (level of participation) −0.979 1.894 0.613 −4.691 0.915
P (performance) 7.608 1.54 0 4.59 9.148
PI (perception of information value) 2.919 4.316 0.51 −5.541 7.236
TR (trust) 0.331 1.759 0.853 −3.116 2.09
PW (power) 4.664 1.184 0.001 2.343 5.848
S (stake) 0.708 1.046 0.51 −1.343 1.754
TE (technical experience) 1.707 2.022 0.413 −2.257 3.729
TI (technocratic insulation) 1.291 0.808 0.133 −0.293 2.099
TN (technical networks) 0.036 1.427 0.98 −2.761 1.463
U (understanding) 0.086 1.441 0.953 −2.74 1.527
AA (access) 0.681 1.085 0.54 −1.444 1.766
AP (access to participation) 1.19 1.153 0.32 −1.071 2.343
OA (outreach activities) −0.12 2.307 0.959 −4.643 2.187
Regression R2 value 0.694
F test P value 0.00014
aValues in bold (except in last two rows) are included in the regression.
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their position vis‐à‐vis other participants. In the first case,
members may tap technical chamber and‐or executive board
members’ expertise to synthesize, elucidate, or interpret
knowledge informing councils’ decisions. The second case
is usually perceived negatively as skewing power within the
council. Thus, the more respondents think decision‐making
processes are inclusive of all members (made during plenary
sections), the more they report using knowledge; in contrast
the more they perceive the process as intermediated by small
groups (decisions made by technical chambers and the
executive board even before the plenary meetings), the less
they report use of technical knowledge.
[29] Fifth, knowledge use is influenced by group com-
position. Councils with a higher number of members who
are nongovernment employees (irrespective of whom they
are representing in the council) tend to report higher levels
of technical knowledge use (the S term in D2). This reflects
the influence of civil society in broadening the agenda and
discussion within the council. Whereas before the reform,
issues of water quantity and quality dominated the official
water resources management agenda, in the river basin
councils, a much broader range of issues has been introduced
(e.g., environmental education, conservation, equitable dis-
tribution of water). Councils also cover a much broader
range of relationships and processes, including the interaction
between water, ecosystems, and socioeconomic systems.
Thus, the inclusion of civil society in the councils may have
pushed new items and broader use of technical knowledge in
the council deliberations, especially when compared with the
less inclusionary prereform agenda.
[30] Sixth, there is a negative correlation between a
measurement of entropy within the council, that is, the level
of agreement or cohesiveness between members and
reported knowledge use (the ET term in D2). The more
members agree with each other (lower entropy) across a
number of different issues (e.g., council role, effectiveness,
level of democracy, and ability to resolve conflict), the
higher the level of technical knowledge use reported. One
explanation is that in councils where the level of conflict is
low, members may be less likely to dispute technical
knowledge presented to them. Another is that the use of
technical knowledge may contribute to diffusing dissent and
building consensus among members (not tested in our
model).
[31] Finally, reported use of technical knowledge corre-
lated negatively with the distribution of power within the
committee; that is, in councils where members perceived
that power was unequally distributed, higher levels of
knowledge use were reported (the PW term in D5). This
makes sense in the context of many committees in which
knowledge is dominated by técnicos, that is, stakeholders
with a technical background (as committee members, hired
consultants, or members of technical chambers). It is likely
that in committees where técnicos play a prominent role, the
use of knowledge will be higher (since they are responsible
for either producing or brokering much of the knowledge
available) and power will be skewed toward those who
produce and understand knowledge and away from those
who do not. In the questionnaire, council members attrib-
uted to technical knowledge the largest source of inequality
within councils. This is also consistent with findings from
qualitative research focusing on river basin committees,
which suggest, that even in the context of expanding par-
ticipation and inclusion of the Brazilian water reform,
técnicos can hold disproportionate levels of power in
councils’ decision‐making processes [Abers et al., 2009;
Lemos, 2008]. While this finding may appear at first glance
to be in contradiction with a positive correlation between
low entropy and knowledge use, it is important to distin-
guish entropy (the level of agreement between members)
and their perception of the distribution of power between
members. The fact that members agree and think alike
regarding many issues within the council does not mean that
they think power is equally or even equitably distributed
between members. Our observations of council meetings
suggest a complex relationship between water users and
técnicos. Although members sometimes resent técnicos for
their tight control of meeting agendas, for the most part they
seek and appreciate expert support. Indeed, even if members
believe técnicos carry the heavier “weight” regarding deci-
sion making, they are also appreciated and well regarded as
working to improve decision making. The councils’ strong
reliance on technical chambers and outside experts (as
consultants) to support their decisions indicates some level
of trust in producers of technical knowledge [Formiga‐
Johnsson et al., 2007].
6. Conclusions
[32] Although the importance of technical knowledge in
informing decision making in water resources management
has been widely recognized by both scholars and practi-
tioners, the factors influencing its use have been examined
empirically relatively little. This study explores knowledge
use across 18 Brazilian river basin councils based on data
collected among 626 council members by the Watermark
survey. Because of the small sample, our main findings refer
primarily to the basins studied. We find that several factors
and processes affect knowledge use across these councils.
First, use of knowledge aligns well with members’ percep-
tion of accessibility; that is, the more accessible knowledge
is, the higher is the level of use reported. In this study,
access goes beyond availability to include also under-
standing. Thus, knowledge should be not only available but
also intelligible to be effective in informing decision making.
Second, the higher the perception of effectiveness and
influence among committee members, that is, whether the
members believe the council to be influential and effective
vis‐à‐vis other sectors of society, the higher the level of
technical knowledge use reported. This positive relationship
suggests that knowledge use is related to a belief among
council members that their decisions matter for the gover-
nance of water across the council’s jurisdiction. Third, the
more that council members perceive most decisions as being
made during plenary meetings, the higher their report of
technical knowledge use. Here again, the perception that
knowledge is used directly by members to make decisions at
the plenary meeting rather than being filtered by experts is
positively associated with higher knowledge use. Fourth,
knowledge use is influenced by group composition; that is,
councils with higher number of members who are not public
officials report higher levels of technical knowledge use.
This suggests that the inclusion of private and civil actors in
the policymaking process broadens the governance agenda
and the use of technical knowledge. Fifth, the level of
agreement between members shapes reported knowledge
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use; that is, the more members that agree with each other
(lower entropy) across a number of different issues (e.g.,
council role, effectiveness, level of democracy, and ability
to resolve conflict), the more they say they use technical
knowledge. Finally, councils whose members perceive
power as unequally distributed report high levels of tech-
nical knowledge use.
[33] Taken together, these findings indirectly support two
statements we made earlier in this article: (1) technical
knowledge might contribute to make decisions easier and
possibly better (at least in the eyes of council members)
while (2) introducing elements of inequality to the processes
of making those decisions. In the case of river basin councils
in Brazil, knowledge use positively aligns with access, a
more diverse and broader agenda, and higher sense of
effectiveness. Yet technical knowledge use is also associ-
ated with skewed levels of power within the councils. This
suggests that action to increase knowledge availability, but
more especially accessibility, may be critical to increase
technical knowledge usefulness in supporting improved
decisions and democracy within integrative and adaptive
approaches to water resources management. This research
shows that technical knowledge use in water management in
Brazil has changed with institutional reform. It has become
more open and diverse and may have contributed to the
sense of effectiveness of new actors introduced into the
management process. But it has also preserved some of its
more traditional role of enabling technocratic insulation (by
skewing power toward technical actors) in the water sector.
The picture painted here is that technical knowledge use is
seldom clear‐cut, and understanding its many implications
is far from straightforward. Further research combining
quantitative approaches with in‐depth understanding of
knowledge use “at the ground” is necessary to inform better
institutional designs to address emerging water‐related
problems.
Appendix A
[34] In our algorithm, each of the 20 variable categories is
considered a gene or trait; each variable within the category
is an allele of this trait. A particular set of variable inputs to
the stepwise regression can be thought of as a genetic
sequence, and the fitness associated with this sequence is
simply the resulting function F above. The genetic algo-
rithm works in a manner analogous to natural selection:
[35] 1. Create a population of m individuals, each
characterized by a randomly selected genetic sequence of
20 variables.
[36] 2. For time steps 1 to t,
a. Evaluate the fitness F for each individual.
b. Let the fittest fraction, ffit, of the population
mate in pairs, producing children whose genetic
sequence includes a random half of the traits from
each parent.
c. Let these children replace the least‐fit fraction
funfit of the population.
[37] 3. Let traits among the population randomly mutate
to other traits at a rate z.
[38] Because the fitness function F varies relatively
smoothly across the variable space, this algorithm will
quickly (within 10 or 20 generations) find locally optimal F
values. By performing different random initial configura-
tions, and varying the population size m, fittest fraction ffit,
and mutation rate z, the entire parameter space can be
explored relatively quickly. The optimal genetic sequence is
the one that consistently emerges as having the highest
F across all populations. For our study, we used populations
between 60 and 80 individuals, fittest fractions between 0.2
and 0.5, and mutation rates between 0.001 and 0.02. This
setup consistently found the same optimal solution within
20 generations, significantly cutting the computational
requirement for finding a simple manual search.
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